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THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
To point out to the man in the street that while the Congress
of the United States may pass laws to suppress the white slave
traffic or the sale of adulterated food, it has no power to prohibit
child-labor or to regulate marriage and divorce, does not add
much to his understanding of American constitutional law. Too
often it merely decreases his respect for the constitution and the
courts which construe it. His feeling is one of exasperation that
any truly national need should exist, any national problem should
cry for solution, and the national legislature should lack the
authority to deal with it.
The point of view of the layman emphasizes in striking fash-
ion the completeness with which, as a people, we have been won
over more or less unconsciously to the belief that Congress has,
or ought to have, authority to pass any salutary law in the interest
of the national welfare. Instead of surprise that Congress
should have the temerity to penetrate into a new field of legisla-
tion, there is impatience to find that there is any such field into
which Congress may not penetrate. It is the purpose of this
article to restate some fundamental doctrines of our constitutional
law and review some of the steps in our constitutional history
with a view to making clear the somewhat precarious trial and
error process by which Congress has come gradually to legislate
in affairs over which it has been supposed to have no jurisdiction
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-to assume responsibility for the safety, health, morals, good
order, and general welfare of the nation, and thus to exercise
what may be called a national police power.
It seems clear that it is entirely proper to use the term "na-
tional police power." To borrow a definition of the police power
from the authority perhaps most competent to lend,1 it is that
power of government which "aims directly to secure and promote
the public welfare" by subjecting to restraint or compulsion the
members of the community. It is the power by which the gov-
ernment abridges the freedom of action or the free use of prop-
erty of the individual in order that the welfare of the state or
natibn may not be jeopardized. It is obvious, then, that when
Congress places a prohibitive tax upon poisonous matches, ex-
cludes obscene literature from the mails, or enacts an employers'
liability law, it is exercising police power. What is the source
and nature of this police power which Congress enjoys and
what are the limitations upon it?
THEORY OF THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
Principle of Enumerated Powers of Congress
To understand clearly the nature of the national police power
it is necessary to bear in mind one of the a b c's of our constitu-
tional law, namely, that Congress enjoys those powers of legis-
lation, and only those, which are positively given to it by the
constitution. Unlike the states, which enjoy all powers which
have not been -taken away from them, it has only the powers which
are delegated to it. The subjects over which it may exercise con-
trol are carefully enumerated. It would be useless to argue a
point so firmly established. Nothing is clearer than that the
purpose of the Convention of 1787 was to confer upon the new
Congress a certain group of powers definitely delimited and to
leave the other powers of government in the hands of the states.
Hamilton's famous argument in the ]ederalist2 against the adop-
tion of a bill of rights to the new constitution urged, it will be
recalled, that to add to the constitution a list of things which
Congress might not do, when Congress had never been given
power by the constitution to do them, savored of the dangerous
1 Freund, Police Power, Sec. 3.
2 Federalist, No. 84.
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doctrine that Congress enjoyed powers not positively granted to
it provided they had not been specifically denied to it. Any such
danger was, of course, obviated by the Tenth Amendment de-
claring that "the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people"; and since that time
commentators and courts have joined with complete unanimity in
making the doctrine that the powers of Congress are enumerated
powers a constitutional axiom.3
The effect of this doctrine of enumerated powers upon the
right of Congress to exercise a national police power is perfectly
plain. The enumeration of congressional powers in the constitu-
tion does not include any general grant of authority to pass laws
for the protection of the health, morals, or general welfare of the
nation. 4 It follows, then, that if Congress is to exercise a police
power at all it must do so by a process something akin to indirec-
tion; that is, by using -the powers which are definitely confided to
it, for the purposes of the police power. If it would enter upon
an ambitious program to protect public morals or safety or health
or to promote good order, it must cloak its good works under its
authority to tax, or to-regulate commerce, or to control the mails,
or the like, and say, "By this authority we pass this law in the
interest of the public welfare." In short, Congress exercises a
generous police power not because that power is placed directly
in its hands but because it has the power to regulate commerce, to
lay taxes, and to control the mails, and uses that authority for
the broad purposes of the general welfare.5
3 "The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the
frame of a national government, of special and enumerated powers. This
is apparent, as will presently be seen from the history of the proceedings
of the convention which framed it; and it has formed the admitted basis
of all legislative and Judicial reasoning upon it ever since it was put in
operation, by all who have been its open friends and advocates as well as
by all who have been its enemies and opponents." Story, Constitution,
5th ed., I. Sec. 909.
4 Sec. 8, Art. I, of the constitution reads: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties. Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States; . . ." It has been generally agreed, however, that this
clause does not confer a general police power upon Congress, but merely
the power of levying taxes, etc., for the purpose of paying the debts and
providing for the common defense and general welfare of the country.
For elaborate review of the authorities on this point, see Watson, Con-
stitution, I, p. 390 et seq.
5 This point is further emphasized and the practice severely criticized
in an illuminating article by judge Charles M. Hough, Covert Legislation
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That Congress can exercise police power only in so far as it
is possible to fitilize one of its enumerated powers for that pur-
pose is not due to accident or inadvertence. The limited nature
df that police power has been emphasized and re-emphasized by
the unsuccessful efforts of those who from 1787 to the present
time have sought to secure its enlargement and invest Congress
with a power adequate to deal with any truly national problem.
The earliest of these efforts was made in the Convention of 1787.
Four resolutions were introduced during the sessions of that
body, varying somewhat in phraseology but similar in purpose.6
That purpose, to quote the language of the one introduced by
Mr. Bedford, was to confer upon Congress the power "to legislate
in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are severally incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individtial legislation." In defeating these resolutions
the Convention passed squarely upon the question whether or not
Congress should enjoy a general police power for the protection
of the national welfare apart from its specifically enumerated
powers and decided that it should not.
There is a difference of opinion among historians and com-
mentators as to whether James Wilson actually held to the
doctrine that Congress possessed any general unenumerated pow-
ers. Certain utterances of his have, however, been quoted to
prove that he held this view; and more than a century later
President Roosevelt used him as an authority in support of his
famous doctrine of "New Nationalism." In 1785 Wilson re-
ferred to the powers of Congress under the Articles of Confed-
eration in the following language: "Though the United States in
congress assembled derive from the particular States no power,
jurisdiction, or right which is not expressly delegated by the con-
federation, it does not -thence follow that the United States in
congress have no other powers, jurisdiction, or rights, than those
delegated by the particular states. The United States have gen-
eral rights, general powers, and general obligations, not derived
and the Constitution, (1917) 30 Harv. Law Rev. 801. See also an article
by Paul Fuller, Is There a Federal Police Power? (1904) 4 Col. Law Rev.
563.
6Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, L p. 229; II,
pp. 25, 26, 367. The first of these was the sixth resolution in the report
of the Committee of the Whole; the others were introduced by Sherman,
Bedford, and Rutledge, respectively.
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from any particular state, nor from all the particular states,
taken separately; but resulting from the union of the whole.
. . . To many purposes the United States are to be considered
as one undividea, independent nation; and as possessed of all the
rights, and powers, and properties by the law of nations incident
to such. Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which
no particular state is competent, the management of it must, of
necessity, belong to the United States in congress assembled.
There are many objects of this extended nature." 7  If such a
construction could be placed upon the powers of the congress of
the Confederation, powers which were not only delegated but
expressly delegated, then surely the same construction could be
placed, a fortiori, upon the powers of Congress under the present
constitution, which omits the word "expressly." When the fed-
eral constitution was before the Pennsylvania convention for
ratification Wilson, who was a member of that body, made a
speech in which he declared that the framers of the constitution
in drawing a line between the powers of -the national government
and those of the states had acted upon the principle that "What-
ever object of government is confined in its operation and effect
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as
belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of
government extends in its operations or effects beyond the bounds
of a particular state, ,should be considered as belonging to the
government of the United States."8  Although this statement
might lend support to the view that Congress could deal with
national problems because they were national even in the absence
of a positive grant of authority to do so, it seems hardly neces-
sary to regard it in any other light than as a simple statement of
the object which the Convention tried to attain in the matter of
distributing powers between the nation and the states. Without
speculating further on the actual significance of the statements
quoted, it may be noted that no trace is found of the so-called
"Wilson Doctrine" in Wilson's judicial utterances, nor is there
other evidence that he ever became an active exponent of that
principle.9
7Considerations on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of North
America, Wilson's Works, Andrews' ed., I, pp. 557, 558.8 Ibid., p. 533.
9 In support of the so-called Wilson doctrine, see: L. H. Alexander,
James Wilson, Patriot, and the Wilson Doctrine, North Am. Rev. vol. 183,
p. 971; Governor Samuel W. Pennypacker, Address at Wilson Memorial
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It remained for President Roosevelt to discover or at least
to label the neutral or "twilight" zone in our constitutional
system-a zone lying between the jurisdictions of the state and
the nation, to which lawbreakers of great wealth might repair
and be free from punishment or restraint. Large corporations
had come to be beyond the reach of,.the state because they had
grown to national dimensions; they were outside the effective
control of Congress because the constitution does not confer
upon Congress a positive grant of authority to deal with them
directly. It was to meet this situation that President Roose-
velt urged his doctrine of "New Nationalism," first as a prin-
ciple of constitutional interpretation, and, failing in that, as a
constitutional amendment. That doctrine may be best stated
in his own words: "It should be made clear that there are
neither vacancies nor interferences between the limits of state
and national jurisdictions, and that both jurisdictions together
compose only one uniform and comprehensive ,system of gov-
ernment ahd laws; that is, whenever the states cannot act,
because the need to be met is not one merely of a single locality,
then the national government, representing all the people,
should have complete power to act."'10  In public addresses
delivered after 1906 President Roosevelt reverted again and
again to this subject, urging always that the federal govern-
ment should be competent to deal with every truly national
prdblem and expressing his impatience at "the impotence which
springs from overdivision of government powers, the impo-
tence which makes it possible for local selfishness or for legal
cunning, hired by wealthy special interests, to bring national
activities to a deadlock.""-
But if this "New Nationalism" is ever to be incorporated into
our constitutional law it will need to be by a constitutional
amendment. In 'the case of Kansas v. Colorado, decided in
1907,12 the Supreme Court was invited to adopt that doctrine
in construing the powers of Congress, but it declined in no
Services, (1906) 55 Am. Law Reg. p. 13; President Roosevelt, speech at
dedication of Pennsylvania state capitol, quoted and discussed in Willough-
by, Constitution, I, p. 48. The doctrini is criticized by Edward Lindsay
in Wilson Versus the "Wilson Doctrine," 44 Am. Law Rev. p. 641.10 From his speech at Ossawatomie, Kansas, August 31, 1910.
i Idem. The doctrine of "New Nationalism"' is discussed and criti-
cized in Willoughby, Constitution, I. pp. 48-66.12 (1907) 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. Ed. 956, 27 S. C. R. 655.
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uncertain language to do so. It was urged upon the court in
that case that Congress had a paramount right to control the
whole system of reclaiming arid lands in a state, whether owned
by the United States or not, on the theory that "all powers
which are national in scope must be found vested in the Con-
gress of the United States." Such a view the court held to be
in direct conflict with -the general established doctrine that the
national government is a government of enumerated powers
and also with the specific provisions of the Tenth Amendment.
"This amendment," declared the court, "which was seemingly
adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present,
disclosed the widespread fear that the national government
might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt
to exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal de-
termination the framers intended that no such assumption should
ever find justification in the organic act, and that if, in the future,
further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by the
people in the manner they had provided for amending that act.
It reads: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.' The argument of counsel
ignores the principal factor in this article, to wit, 'the people.' Its
principal purpose was not the distribution of power between the
United States and the states, but a reservation to the people of
all powers not granted." It would seem from this opinion that
President Roosevelt's "twilight zone" is firmly intrenched in our
constitutional system and that those who hope to develop a na-
tional police power by interpretation or by any method but
amendment are doomed to disappointment.'"
Principle of Implied Powers
It is perfectly certain that under the doctrine that Congress
has no powers which are not enumerated in the constitution it
would have been quite impossible to develop a national police
13 This doctrine of a general, inherent, unenumerated power of Con-
gress is not to be ronfused with what Story termed "resulting powers," or
those deduced from several or all of the enumerated powers of Congress.
See Commentaries, 5th ed., II, Sec. 1256. Among the examples of such
"resulting powers" are the power to exercise the right of eminent domain,
Kohl v. United States, (1875) 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. Bd 449; the power to
issue legal tender notes, Juilliard v. Greenman, (1884) .110 U. S. 421, 28 L.
Ed. 204, 4 S. C. R. 122; and the power to exclude aliens, Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, (1893) 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. Ed. 905, 13 S. C. R. 1016. See
Willoughby, Constitution, I, Secs. 37, 38.
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power were it not for the fact that the scope of congressional
authority was vastly increased, and the possibility of ever-multi-
plying extensions of power opened up, by the establishment upon
a firm foundation of the so-called doctrine of implied powers.
It will be recalled that under the Articles of Confederation "Each
State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confed-
eration expressly delegated to the United States in Congress as-
sembled."1 4 When the Tenth Amendment was being debated by
Congress in 1789 a motion was made to insert there also the word
"expressly" before the word "delegated.". This motion, however,
was rejected.15 The bitter controversy which raged between the
Federalists and the anti-Federalists as to whether or not Congress
might exercise powers which were not expressly conferred was
not settled finally and authoritatively until Marshall's famous
opinion in 1819 in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland."' It was
in that opinion that Marshall gave his classic -statement of the
doctrine of implied powers: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, are constitutional." Thus the ghost of strict con-
struction was laid forever, at least so far as the Supreme Court
was concerned; and in 1884 Mr. Justice Miller, by way of giving
it a suitable epitaph, took occasion to allude to "the old argument,
often heard, often repeated, and in this court never assented to,
that when a question of the power of Congress arises the advocate
of the power must be able to place his finger on the words which
expressly grant i.t.''17
Thus it will be seen that while the doctrine of enumerated
powers .imposes upon Congres§ the necessity of finding among its
delegated powers what has been aptly termed "a definite consti-
tutional peg" upon which to hang every exercise of the national
police power, the doctrine of implied powers, or the liberal con-
struction of congressional authority, has made it possible to hang
upon those "pegs" an enormous amount of salutary legislation in
the interest of the national health, safety, and well being. The
14 Art. II. Italics are the author's.
15 Annals of Congress, I, p. 768.16 (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316.
17 Ex parte Yarbrough, (1884) 110 U. S. 651, 658, 28 L. Ed. 274, 4 S. C.
R. 152.
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"pegs" themselves are few in number, the only important ones
being the power to regulate commerce, the power to tax, and the
power to establish and run the postal system; but the police legis-
lation which they have been made to support deals with anything
from the white slave -traffic to speculation in cotton.
LIMITATIONS ON THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
In the exercise of its police power Congress is subject to three
definite constitutional limitations. The first of these limitations
has already been outlined: Congress must, in passing police legis-
lation, use an enumerated power; in other words, there must
always be a constitutional peg. This would seem on first thought
to be entirely obvious. Yet occasionally Congress has tried,
always unsuccessfully, to do without the peg. In 1867 Congress
forbade the sale of illuminating oils which were below a certain
fire test.'8  The law was declared invalid because it was entirely
unrelated to any of the delegated powers19 of Congress. It was
not a regulation of interstate commerce; it was not a tax; and
Congress did not pretend that it was. Fur the same reason the
act of 1876 punishing the counterfeiting of trademarks and the
sale of counterfeit trademark goods2° was declared unconstitu-
tional."' The excerpt quoted above2 ' from the opinion of the
court in Kansas v. Colorado emphasizes the same point. In all
of these cases Congress had tried to pass police regulations with-
out finding a constitutional peg on which to hang them.
The second limitation requires that a real relevancy exist be-
tween the police regulation and the peg upon which it is hung.
Assuming that Congress in exercising its police power uses one of
its delegated powers and labels its act accordingly as a tax law, a
regulation of commerce, or the like, the law must then pass the
test: is there a reasonable enough connection between the law
Congress has passed and the constitutional grantof poweronwhich
Congress has relied in passing it to warrant its being regarded as
a regulation of commerce, or the mails, or the like? If our courts
18 Act of March 2, 1867, Chap. 169 Sec. 29, 14 Stat. at L. 484.
'9 United States v. De Witt, (1870) 9 Wall' (U.S.) 41. The title of the
act was "An Act to amend existing Laws relating to Internal Revenue,
and for other Purposes." The section involved here must have been one
of those passed "for other purposes," for it made no reference to any tax.
20 Act of August 14, 1876. 19 Stat. at L. 141.
21 Trade-Mark Cases, (1879) 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550.
22 Supra, p. 295.
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in determining the validity of legislation took account of the
motives of law-makers, these motives would in the main tend to
become the test of the validity of the law; but since the courts
ignore those motives and take legislation at its face value, the
relevancy of the law to its label becomes the test. In other words,
it is proper enough for Congress to use its power over interstate
commerce as a means of protecting the national health or morals;
but Congress must not get so absorbed in the work of protecting
the national health or morals that it forgets that it is, after all,
supposed to be regulating interstate commerce. When this test
was applied to the law passed in 1907 by which Congress made it
a felony for any person to harbor an alien prostitute within three
years after her entrance into this country,23 the court found that
while the authority of Congress to regulate immigration was un-
doubted and while the law of which the provision in question was
a part was entitled "An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens
into the United States," nevertheless that provision did not as a
matter of fact regulate immigration.24 "The validity of the provi-
sion in question," declared the court, "should be determined from
its general effect upon the importation and exclusion of aliens.
But it is sufficient to say that the act charged has no significance in
either direction." The provision was invalid because it did not
bear a sufficiently close relation to anything over which the consti-
tution gives Congress authority to act. In a case which will be
discussed at a later point 2 it was held that the provision of the
Erdman Act forbidding interstate carriers to discharge employees
because of membership in labor organizations was not a legiti-
mate exercise of congressional authority because there was no
connection between interstate commerce and membership in a
labor union.26 In the other cases which will be considered in the
course of this article it will be seen that no law which Congress
has passed in the exercise of a national police power has been
upheld unless the court has, after careful scrutiny of this point,
23 Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. at L. 898.
24 Keller v. United States, (1909) 213 U. S. 138, 53 L. Ed. 737, 29 S. C.
R. 470, 16 Ann. Cas. 1066.
25 Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 28 S. C.
R. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764. See infra, pp. 308, 317.
26 Professor Goodnow takes the view that this part of the opinion is
dictum, since the courf had already declared the provision under consider-
ation to be a violation of the due process of law clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Social Reform and .the Constitution, 81 et seq.
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been convinced that the law was at the same time a real and sub-
stantial exercise of one of the enumerated powers of Congress.
The third limitation, or set of limitations, upon the national
police power is to be found in the specific prohibitions upon con-
gressional authority contained in the constitution and particularly
in the bill of rights. These restrictions operate in a perfectly
obvious and direct fashion. Congress may use its delegated
powers for the protection of the national welfare; but in so doing
it must not take life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, take private property for public use without just compen-
sation, interfere with religious liberty, or do any of those things
which it is definitely forbidden by the constitution to do. This
third limitation rests upon the well-established principle that the
specific prohibitions of the constitution act as restraints upon the
general grants of powers to Congress.2 7 The restriction of due
process of law is the one perhaps most commonly enforced against
exercises of the national police power, particularly those passed
under the commerce clause; but in the exercise of the power over
the postal system for the protection of the national morals or
safety the question has sometimes arisen whether or not Congress
has violated the guarantees of freedom of the press, or the guar-
antee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 28
In the light of the foregoing constitutional principles and
limitations, it is the purpose of the present article to discuss the
police power which Congress has exercised under the grant of
authority to regulate commerce; and to mark out the scope and
variety of the protection which has been accorded the national
safety, health, morals, and general welfare in this somewhat in-
direct and roundabout way.
GENERAL NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE POWER
If one were obliged to name the most potent cause leading to
the calling of the Convention of 1787 he would not hesitate in
choosing the need for a national control over foreign and inter-
27 Story, Constitution, II, Sec. 1864 et seq. Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, (1893) 148 U. S. 312. 336. 37 L. Ed. 463. 13 S. C. R. 622.
28 Ex parte Jackson. (1877) 96 U. S. 727. 24 L. Ed. 877: In re Rapier,
(1892) 143 U. S. 110. 36 L. Ed. 93, 12 S. C. R. 374: Lewis Publishing Co.
v. Morgan, (1913) 229 U. S. 288, 57 L. Ed. 1190. 33 S. C. R. 867; Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, (1904) 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. Ed. 1092, 24 S. C. R.
789.
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state commerce. That there was scant discussion of the problem
in the Conventioh was perhaps due to the unanimity of convic-
tion among the members of that body that the power to regulate
commerce should unquestionably rest in the new Congress. Since
the adoption of the constitution no small part of the time of Con-
gress has been occupied with the exercise. of this power, and
no small part of the time of the Supreme Court has been spent in
passing upon the constitutionality and meaning of those laws.
Considering the wide range of instrumentalities and transactions
which have come to be included in the term commerce it is but
natural that the authority to regulate it should serve as the ion-
stitutional basis for the development of a wide national police
power.
The constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate
three kinds of commerce: first, "with foreign nations," second,
"among the several states," and third, "with the Indian tribes., 29
The power given in respect to each of these is the same, that is,
the power to "regulate"; and there is nothing in the .language
used to indicate that the framers of the constitution had in mind
any distinctions as to the extent of the power of Congress over
each type. Congress early utilized its authority ovef these differ-
ent classes of commerce, however, in different ways, to meet
widely different problems, and apparently without stopping to
discuss whether its power over one was greater than over an-
other. It was not until railroad transportation reached a high
point of development that Congress, a full century after the fram-
ing of the constitution, began to turn its mind seriously to the
problems of interstate commerce regulation. But in the mean-
time the regulations of foreign and Indian commerce had been
numerous and rigorous in character. The question has, therefore,
become pertinent whether Congress actually does have exactly
the same power over interstate commerce that it enjoys over
commerce with foreign nations and with the Indian tribes, or
whether that power is more restricted. Especially has it been re-
peatedly urged by those interested in the expansion of a national
police power that Congress could exercise every power over inter-
state commerce which it could exert in controlling foreign com-
merce.
3 0
29 Art. I, Sec. 8.
30 This position, has been taken, for instance, by those who believe
that Congress may restrict child-labor by means of its control over inter-
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It is possible to cite several cases in which the Supreme Court
has expressed the opihion that there is no difference between the
powers of Congress over foreign and interstate commerce.3 1 Mar-
shall voiced this view in Gibbons v. Ogden,3 2 and in 1888 Mr.
Justice Mathews in Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. declared,
"The power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among
the States is indeed contained in the same clause of the Constitu-
tion which confers upon it power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations. The grant is conceived in the same terms, and
the two powers are undoubtedly of the same class and character
and equally extensive. '3 3 While these statements sound perfectly
conclusive and final, the fact remains that in passing upon the
validity of several of the congressional police regulations over
interstate commerce the court, though urged to do so, has steadily
declined to uphold such regulations on the ground that similar
police restrictions applicable to foreign commerce have been sus-
tained. 4 A substantial body of opinion has grown up in support
of the view that there is, after all, a difference between the two
powers. It is urged by an eminent authority that "although the
three classes of commerce are thus included in the same clause
and in the same terms in the enumeration of powers, they are
clearly distinguishable in their historic setting and constitutional
import, and the laws which are necessary and proper in regulating
commercial intercourse with foreign nations and with the Indian
tribes may not be necessary and proper in regulating such com-
mercial intercourse between the states."35 Without anticipating
the more detailed discussion of this problem appropriate at a later
point in this article, it may be suggested that Congress has actu-
ally exercised a police power over foreign commerce which there
is reason to believe, would be regarded as beyond its proper
authority if applied to commerce among the several states. And
while there is no authoritative judicial pronouncement upon this
question, an authority over interstate commerce which does not
state commerce. This point will be further considered in a later section
of this article.31 For citation of these cases, with comment, see note by E. B. Whitney,
7 Yale Law Jour. 294.
32 (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 228, 6 L. Ed. 23.
33 (1888) 125 U. S. 465. 482, 31 L. Ed. 700, 8 S. C. R. 689.
34 This was true both in :the Lottery Case and in the recent child-labor
case; it will be treated more fully in connection with the latter case.15 Judson, Interstate Commerce, 3rd ed., Sec. 6.
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extend to the exclusion from the channels of that commerce of the
products of factories employing child-labor 6 can hardly be called
co-extensive with an authority over foreign commerce which ex-
cludes from our shores the products of convict-labor.3 7
The relationship between the national government and the In-
dians has always been regarded as anomalous, and it would be
unprofitable to enter upon any extended comparison of the power
of Congress over interstate commerce with that over commerce
with the Indian tribes. Our control over these people has been
paternalistic in character.38 Because of the importance and deli-
cacy of the problem, Congress has regulated intercourse with the
Indians with a rigorous hand. It has forbidden commercial deal-
ings with them in certain commodities, as, for example, intoxi-
cating liquors ;"9 and has even gone to the length of. forbidding
any one to trade with them without a license issued by the federal
government. 40 It seems probable that restraints have been placed
upon commerce with the Indians which could not be imposed upon
ordinary trade relations between citizens of the states.
The following discussion of the police power which Congress
has come to exercise under the commerce clause may properly be
confined, therefore, to the problems relating to interstate com-
merce. This is appropriate not only because it is in that field of
regulation that the national police power has developed in most
striking and most varied form, but also because the preceding
paragraphs make it clear that if there is any constitutional dis-
tinction among the powers of Congress over foreign, interstate,
and Indian commerce the power over interstate commerce is the
most narrowly restricted; and accordingly whatever police power
Congress may exercise over interstate commerce it may exercise
over foreign and Indian commerce.
36 Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. C .P, 529.
37 Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. at L. 195. The validity of this law
has never been questioned and would seem, in the light of numerous prec-
edents, to be unquestionable.
31 Matter of Heff, (1905) 197 U. S. 488. 498, 49 L. Ed. 848, 25 S. C. R.
501 (overruled in United States v. Nice, [1916] 241 U. $. 591, 36 S. C. R.
696).
39 Held valid in United States v. Holliday, (1866) 3 Wall. (U.S.) 407,
18 L. Ed. 182; United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, (1876)
93 U. S. 188. 23 L. Ed. 846.
40 Upheld in United States v.- Cisna, (1835) 25 Fed. Cas. 422. See Act
of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 1009.
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While the police regulations which Congress has passed under
its authority to regulate interstate commerce have been exceed-
ingly numerous and have dealt with a wide range of topics, from
locomotive ashpans to obscene literature, they may all be placed
for convenience in four groups, according to the general purpose
of their enactment and the constitutional principles upon which
they are based. (I) In the first group may be placed those regu-'
lations in which Congress has exercised police power for the pro-
tection and promotion of interstate commerce itself by the enact-
ment of such laws as the safety appliance acts, the anti-trust acts,
and other regulations designed to keep that commerce safe, effi-
cient, and unobstructed. (II) The second group comprises the
cases in which the law forbids the use of interstate commerce as
a medium or channel for transactions which menace the national
health, morals, or welfare. In this class would be placed the Pure
Food Act, the White Slave Act, -and other statutes by which Con-
gress, instead of protecting commerce itself from danger, pro-
tects the nation from the misuse of that commerce. (III) The
third group consists of the enactments by which Congress co-oper-
ates with the states by forbidding the use of the facilities of inter-
state commerce for the purpose of evading or violating state police
regulations. Here would be found such laws as the Webb-
Kenyon Act, excluding from interstate commerce shipments of
liquor consigned to dry territory. (IV) In the last group should
be placed the Keating-Owen Child-Labor Act of 1916, by which
Congress attempted to deny the privileges of interstate commerce
to articles produced under conditions which Congress disapproved
but which it had no direct power to control. Careful con-
sideration may profitably be given to each of these groups.
I. NATIONAL POLICE POWER FOR PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
OF COMMERCE
1. Appliances and Physical Regulations Necessary for Safety.
It is but natural that Congress should feel that one of the most
obvious and necessary duties imposed upon it by the grant of
power to regulate commerce is the duty to pass police regulations
to protect from destruction, loss, or damage the lives, liffibs, and
property of persons concerned in the processes or transactions of
interstate commerce, whether as passengers, shippers, or em-
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ployees. As early as 1838 laws were passed requiring the in-
stallation of safdty devices upon steam vessels. 4- Beginning with
a statute passed in 1866 .Congress has rigorously controlled the
transportation on land and water of explosives. 42 But it was not
until 1893 that Congress began to enact the comprehensive set of
safety appliance acts now applicable to interstate railroads.4 3 The
first of these acts was the Automatic Coupler Act,44 which has
been supplemented by more recent laws requiring, among other
things, the use of ashpans45 on locomotives, the inspection of
boilers,46 and the use of ladders, hand-brakes, drawbars, and
similar devices on cars.4 7 To the same general purpose are the
statutes requiring railroads to make full reports to the Interstate
Commerce Commission regarding all accidents. 48  A statute of
1913 protects interstate commerce from another type of loss by
making criminal the unauthorized breaking of the seals of rail-
road cars containing interstate or foreign shipments.49
The purpose of Congress in passing these laws' is perfectly
plain. Most of them, following the pioneer Safety Appliance
Act of 1893, declare specifically that their object is "to Promote
the safety of employees and travellers upon railroads." The
courts have uniformly recognized this purpose. "The Safety
Appliance Act," declares one federal judge, "is essentially a police
regulation. Its general purpose is humanitarian-the safeguard-
ing of employees from injury and death." 50  In the words of
another court, "the object of Congress in passing the safety ap-
pliance acts was undoubtedly to safeguard interstate commerce,
the life of the passengers, and the life and limb of the employees
41 Act of July 7, 1838, 5 Stat. at L. 304; Act of March 3, 1843, ibid., 626.
4.2 Act of July 3, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 81. For legislation on this subject
now in force, see the U. S. Criminal Code of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L.
1134, Secs. 232-236.
43 Collected in Comp. Stat. 1918, Secs. 8605-8650; 3 U. S. S. A. 480-530.
-4 Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. at L. 531.
45Act of May 30, 1908, 35 Stat. at L. 476.
46 Acts of February 17, 1911, 36 Stat. at L. 913, and March 4, 1915, 38
ibid., p. 1192.
47Act of April 14, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 298.
48Act of May 6, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 351; Act of February 17, 1911,
ibid., p. 216.
49 Act bf February 13. 1913, 37 Stat. at L. 670. Upheld in Morris v.
United States, (1916) 229 Fed. 516.
50 United States v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry. Co., (1915) 223 Fed. 215, 216.
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engaged therein." 51 The Supreme Court itself has declared the
purpose of this legislation to be "to promote the public welfare
by securing the safety of employees and travellers.
52
That these statutes designed to insure the physical safety of
interstate commerce are police regulations falling well within the
recognized limits of congressional power .is too obvious to call
for argument; so obvious, in fact, that the Supreme Court has
never been asked to decide a case in which'it was squarely con-
tended that acts of this kind were not natural and legitimate regu-
lations of commerce.53  Moreover; in several cases involving the
meaning and application of these statutes, as well as in cases in-
volving analogous exercises of the commerce power, that tribunal
has alluded to the safety appliance acts in terms which place the
question of their validity in the realm of settled law.54 And in-
deed if the power to regulate commerce does not include .the
power to make reasonable rules to secure the physical safety of
the lives and property of travellers, shippers, and employees, it
may well be inquired what conceivable kind of commercial regu-
lation could be regarded as legitimate.
2. Regulations of Labor Necessary for Safety of Interstate
Commerce. (a) Hours of Service Act: It came at last to be
recognized that safety appliances and regulations were not enough
in and of themselves, to insure the physical -safety of interstate
commerce. There were plenty of gruesome proofs of the fact
that life and property on interstate railroads were as much
jeopa.rdized by the deadening fatigue of a locomotive engineer
as by the absence of block signals or automatic couplers. Ac-
cordingly, in 1907 Congress passed the Hours of Service Act,
55
making it unlawful for any interstate carrier to employ a train-
51United States v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., (1913) 214 Fed. 498, 499.
52 Johnson v. So. Pacific Co., (1904) 196 U. S. 1, 17, 49 L. Ed. 365, 25
S. C. R. 158.
53 The validity of these laws has been passed upon squarely, however,
in numerous decisions of the lower federal courts. For extensive citation
of cases, see Thornton, The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 3rd ed., p.
334; Richey, Federal Employers' Liability, Safety Appliance, and Hours
of Service Acts, 2nd ed., Sec. 215.
54 Johnson v. So. Pacific Co., supra; Schlemmer v. Buffalo, etc., Ry Co.,
(1907) 205 U. S. 1. 51 L. Ed. 681, 27 S. C. R. 407; Employers' Liability
Cases, (1908) 207 U. S. 463. 52 L. Ed. 297, 28 S. C. R. 141; Southern Ry.
Co. v. United States, (1911) 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. Ed. 72. 32 S. C. R. 2;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed. 327, 32
S. C. R. 169. 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 44; Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332,
61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S. C. R. 298.
55 March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. at L. 1415.
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man for a period longer than sixteen consecutive hours and re-
quiring definite rest periods in every twenty-four hours. The
hours of train dispatchers and telegraphers were still further re-
duced, thirteen consecutive hours being the maximum where only
day work was required and nine hours out of twenty-four where
both night and day work was expected.
It is important to bear in mind that such a limitation upon
hours of service as that provided for in the act of 1907 stands in
sharp contrast, both in purpose and in constitutional justification,
to such a statute as the Adamson Law providing for a standard
eight-hour day on interstate railroads. While the employees
affected by the Hours of Service Act would of course benefit by
the relief granted from continuous labor for long hours, such
relief constituted only a secondary motive for the passage of the
act; certainly the legal authorization of a sixteen-hour day does
not indicate a very vigorously humanitarian interest in the welfare
of the workingmen affected. The object of the act was quite
clearly to promote the safety of interstate commerce on railroads;
and the title of the statute specifically declares it to be "An Act
to Promote the Safety of Employees and Travellers upon Rail-
roads by Limiting the Hours of Service of Employees Thereon."
Viewed thus as a safety regulation, there could be no serious
question as to the validity of the act; and in upholding it as a
valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce
Mr. Justice Hughes declared: "In its power suitably to provide
for the safety of employees and travelers, Congress was not
limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances,
but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor to reduce,
the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on
the part of engineers, conductors, train dispatchers, telegraphers,
and other. persons embraced within the clause defined by the
act."56 At'a later point in this article5 7 it will be made clear that
no such argument as this was applied to the Adamson Law, and
it was sustained by the Supreme Court on widely different
grounds.
(b) Employers' Liability Statutes: When Congress, after
considerable prodding by an energetic and persistent president,5s
56Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Int. Corn. Comm., (1911) 221 U. S. 612,
55 L. Ed. 878; 31 S. C. R. 621.
57Infra, p. 315.
58 President Roosevelt urged the passage of the act in various mes-
sages to Congress.
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finally passed the first Employers' Liability Act in 1906,r9 there
is every reason to believe that the members of that body were
actuated by a humanitarian interest in the welfare of the work-
men on interstate railroads. Like the state legislatures which had
passed similar laws, they wished to take away the unjust and
oppressive burdens which the common law doctrines of employ-
ers' liability had placed upon the shoulders of the injured work-
man. Senator Dolliver, who was a particularly vigorous pro-
ponent of the law, expressed in the senate his belief that there was
not a single senator "who does not recognize the equity and justice
involved" in such legislation, and added that "there is scarcely an
American state in these recent years which has not taken this
step forward in industrial justice."60 The federal employers' lia-
bility laws were passed in order to guarantee to the men to whom
they applied a reasonably square deal.
It must, therefore, have been something of a surprise to the
members of Congress who had fought and voted for this legis-
lation to learn from the Supreme Court that what they had really
passed was not an act to secure economic justice in certain rela-
tions between employers and employees in interstate commerce,
but a safety regulation."' It will throw some light upon the
nature of the limitations resting upon the police power of Con-
gress to understand why it is that from the standpoint of consti-
tutional law there is no substantial difference between the Em-
ployers' Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act.
It is not difficult to follow the steps in the chain of reasoning
which led the Supreme Court to this somewhat startling result.
In the first place, the power under which Congress is purporting
to act in passing the Employers' Liability Act is the authority to
regulate commerce; Congress has no power to regulate labor as
such. It follows, therefore, that only those regulations of the
relations between master and servant which are at the same time
50June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 232.
60 Quoted by Thornton in his excellent summary of the legislative his-
tory of the act. See Thornton, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 3rd ed.
61 The first Employers' Liability Act was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in -the Employers' Liability Cases, (1908) 207 U. S. 463,
52 L. Ed. 297, 28 S. C. R. 141, because its provisions extended to include the
employees of interstate carriers even when such employees were not them-
selves engaged in any of the processes of interstate commerce. Congress
remedied this defect in passing the second statute, April 22, 1908, 35 Stat.
at L. 65. which was held valid in the Second Employers' Liability Cases,
(1912) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed. 327, 32 S. C. R. 169, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 44.
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regulations of commerce are within the power of Congress. Only
three years before, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Harlan in the Adair case, had declared that one of the reasons
why Congress had exceeded its power when it forbade interstate
carriers to discharge any employee because he belonged to a labor
union was because "there is no such connection between interstate
commerce and membership in a labor organization as to authorize
Congress" to pass such a law.62 Now if the only object and result
of the employers' liability statutes was to secure a more equitable
incidence of the burden of industrial accidents between the em-
ployers and the employees in interstate commerce and thereby
to protect the welfare of a certain economic group, then Congress
in passing such an act had again exceeded its authority, since it
could hardly be shown that the statute really regulated interstate
commerce or bore any reasonable relation to it. But if, on the
other hand, it could be shown that the act would promote or
protect interstate commerce in some definite way, then, of course,
it could be upheld. Counsel for the government therefore wisely
urged upon the court with great vigor the view that "if the con-
ditions under which the agents or instrumentalities do the work
of commerce are wrong or disadvantageous, those bad conditions
may and often will prevent or interrupt the act of commerce or
make it less expeditious, less reliable, less economical, and less
secure." 63  It is a well established principle of constitutional
construction that a statute, when possible, should be so construed
as to gave it; and the court readily adopted the alluring argument
which made it possible to sustain the validity of the act. It de-
clared its belief that "the natural tendency of the changes de-
scribed is to impel the carriers to avoid or prevent the negligent
acts and omissions which are made the bases of the rights of
recovery which the statute creates and defines; and as whatever
makes for that end tends to promote the safety of the employees
and to advance the commerce in which they are engaged, we
entertain no doubt that in making those changes Congress acted
within the limits of the discretion confided to it by the Consti-
tution.' '64 Thus a statute which, viewed merely as a measure to
insure economic justice to the employees of interstate carriers,
62 Note 25, supra.
63 Second. Employers' Liability Cases, note 61, supra, 223 U. S. at p. 48.
64 Ibid., p. 50. For a criticism of this point of view, see L. J. Hall, The
Federil Employers' Liability Act, (1910) 20 Yale Law Jour. 122, in which
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would doubtless have been invalidated, was enabled to pass the
scrutiny of the courts by donning the somewhat transparent dis-
guise of a regulation to prevent railroad accidents.
3. Regulations Necessary to Prevent the Obstruction or Sus-
pension of Interstate Commerce. It has been suggested above
that perhaps the most important cause for the formation and
adoption of our federal constitution was the desire to establish a
government with power to regulate foreign and interstate com-'
merce according to a uniform rule and thereby to put an end to
the chaos of obstructions, burdens, and inharmonious systems of
control affecting that commerce which emanated from the jeal-
ousies of thirteen separate commonwealths. The very first case
in which the commerce clause of the new constitution came before
the Supreme Court for interpretation was a case in which the
court refused to allow the state of New York to obstruct the
freedom of interstate commerce by granting to one of its citizens
an exclusive right to navigate the Hudson River by steamboat. 5
Since that time no small proportion of the judicial attention which
the commerce clause has received has been directed to the prob-
lem of preventing state interference with interstate commerce.
It would seem, therefore, that in exercising its delegated power to
regulate commerce Congress could tread on no safer ground,
could use its authority in no way more clearly in harmony with
the purpose for which it was conferred, than when it passed
regulations designed to prevent the obstruction or suspension of
commerce.
And while, curiously enough, the positive enactments of this
kind to be found in the federal statute books are not quite so
numerous nor elaborate as one might expect, yet they present
some problems of peculiar interest to those interested in the de-
velopment of a national police power. They may be conveniently
arranged in the' following groups, each of which merits some
comment.
(a) Regulations to Prevent Physical Obstructions: It is un-
it is urged that "it is only by an indirect and unsatisfactory method of
reasoning that it can be said that safety in transportation is promoted by
increasing the amount of damages which a railroad company must pay for
the acts of carelessness of its men in their relations to each other." It will
be noted that the article was written before the Second Employers' Lia-
bility Cases were decided, but its reasoning is applicable to the doctrine of
those cases.
65 Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
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necessary to enlarge upon the fact that Congress has full author-
ity to penalize any act which results in the physical obstruction
or interference with commerce. "Any offense," declared Mr.
Justice Story in 1838, "which thus interferes with, obstructs, or
prevents such commerce and- navigation, though done on land,
may be punished by Congress, under its general authority to make
all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated constitu-
tional powers." 68 Congress has accordingly enacted a fairly sub-
stantial penal code designed to preserve and protect navigable
rivers and harbors from obstruction, to regulate the erection of
bridges and piers, and in various other ways to keep commerce
by water free and untrammeled. 7  There would seem to be no
doubt as to the existence of similar congressional authority to
afford this kind of protection to the facilities of interstate land
commerce; but, with the exception of the Larceny Act of 1913,
already mentioned above,68 and some of the recent war legisla-
tion,69 Congress has, except in emergencies which will be alluded
to later, 70 preferred to rely upon the criminal laws of the several
states to prevent the physical obstruction of interstate commerce
by land.
(b) Regulations to Prevent Economic Obstructions or Re-
straints of Commerce. (1) By combinations of capital: It would
not be relevant to the subject under consideration to launch out
upon any extended discussion of the highly interesting and impor-
tant laws Congress has passed for the purpose of solving the so-
called trust problem. The fact that the policy of the federal gov-
ernment toward trusts and monopolies has not always been happy
in its conception or successful in its administration has little to
do with the fact that the general underlying motives of that
policy have always been the same: namely, to keep interstate
commerce free from the obstacles and interferences resulting
from monopoly and other combinations and conspiracies designed
to destroy free competition and restrain trade. It will hardly.be
66 United States v. Coombs, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 72, 9 L. Ed. 1004.
67 See U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918 Sec. 9909 et seq.
68 Supra, p. 304, 'note 49.
69 The War Materials Destruction Act of April 20, 1918. By the provi-
sions of this act the instrumentalities and facilities of interstate commerce.
or "war utilities" as they are called, are, along with "war materials" and
"war premises," protected from wilful injury and destruction. The act
rests, of course, upon the war power of Congress and not on the com-
merce power.
70 Infra, pp. 314, 315, notes 87, 88.
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denied that these acts are police regulations designed for the pro-
tection of commerce. The first of these statutes penalized certain
specific acts, such as discriminations among shippers and rebatifig,
which Congress deemed destructive to the freedom of competition
desirable in interstate commerce. This type of regulation includes
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the various amend-
ments to it passed since that time.7' Federal police regulations
making certain acts criminal were soon found to be a very inad-
equate means of freeing interstate commerce from monopolistic
obstructions; and so" Congress, convinced that relief could be had
by breaking up trusts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade, enacted the famous Sherman Act of 1890.72 After two
decades of sporadic and more or less ineffectual "trust-busting,"
Congress supplemented the Sherman Act by legislation designed
to make the act more definite in meaning and effective in opera-
tion.73 This supplementary anti-trust act, known as the Clayton
Act, was accompanied by the passage of the Trade Commission
Act.7 4 By the passage of this latter act -Congress embarked upon
a new policy in respect to combinations of capital-the policy of
administrative control. While this act must still be regarded as
a federal police regulation for the protection of commerce, the
inethod employed for that purpose was the creation of an admin-
istrative commission with power to investigate, advise, and issue
71 Act of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. at L, 379. The text of this act and
the amendments thereto are set forth and discussed at length in Judson.
Interstate Commerce. 3rd ed. See also, Fuller, The Interstate Commerce
Act, (1915). One striking instance of this type of police regulation over
interstate commerce is to be found in the commodities clause of the Hep-
burn Act, June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 584. The purpose of this act was to
compel the interstate railroads to dispose of such interests as they might
have in the coal mining business by making it unlawful for them to carry
in interstate commerce "any article or commodity other than timber and
the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined or produced by
it. or under its authority, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in
which it may have an interest, direct or indirect . . ." The leeislative
purpose, however, was not effectuated. because the Supreme Court in pass-
ing upon the constitutionality of the law construed it in such a way as to
permit the railroad to transport coal from its own mines provided such
coal had been sold by the railroad before such transportation took place.
United States v. Delaware, etc., Co.. (1909) 213 U. S. 366, 53 L. Ed. 836,
29 S. C. R. 527. For an e Scellent discussion of the history, interpretation,
and operation of the clause, see Kibler, The Commodities Clause (1916) ;
also Hand, the Commodities Clause and the Fifth Amendment, (1909) 22
Harv. Law Rev. 250.
72 Act of July 2. 1890. 26 Stat. at L. 209.
73 The Clayton Act of October 15. 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 731.
74 Act of September 26, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 719.
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orders based upon definite findings of fact. Combinations of
capital formerly in bad odor merely because of their size and
importance were to be kept within the law and prevented from
interfering with the freedom of commerce by an active govern-
mental supervision and co-operation.
While -the litigation which has arisen under these acts, or at
least under the earlier ones, has been exceedingly voluminous
and the courts have spent much time construing and applying
them to the concrete problems which have arisen, there seems
never to have been any serious question raised as to the authority
of Congress to pass laws designed to accomplish the results which
these acts sought to achieve. Such constitutional objections as
have been urged against fhese enactments have been aimed at the
details of method and procedure rather than at the validity of the
legislative object.7 5
(2) By combinations of labor: While Congress seems never
to have passed, under its commerce power, any police legislation
which in express terms names labor organizations and forbids
them to enter into conspiracies or to commit acts which would
obstruct or suspend interstate commerce, several of its enact-
ments are couched in terms broad enough to permit the courts
to apply their restraints and prohibitions to combinations of
laborers.
This is true, in the first place, of the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887.76 This act makes it unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of the statute "to make or give any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular descrip-
tion of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any par-
ticular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any
particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage. ' 77  It is specifically made criminal
under heavy penalty for "any common carrier subject to the pro-
visions of this act, or, when such common carrier is a corporation,
any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, or lessee,
agent, or person acting for or employed by such corporation," to
75 Any doubt as to the validity of the Sherman Act was set at rest by
the decision in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, (1899) 175
U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 136, 20 S. C. R. 96.
7r Note 71, supra.
'7 Sec. 3.
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do or conspire to do any of the unlawful acts above set forth.78
In 1893 Judge Taft held that these provisions were applicable to
the officers and members of a brotherhood of locomotive engineers
who had induced the railroad for which they worked to join
them in a boycott against a railroad which was engaged in a strike
because of its refusal to meet certain demands of its men.7 9 As
long as the men remained in the employ of the railroad they were
subject to injunctions to restrain them from violations of these
provisions. Judge Taft also declared that a conspiracy on the part
of the employees to violate these sections could be punished under
the general provision of the Criminal Code penalizing those who
"conspire to commit any offense against the United States."80 It
is thus clear that the Interstate Commerce Act is not only applic-
able to common carriers but imposes restraints and obligations
for the protection of interstate commerce upon labor organizations
as well.8'
In like manner the Sherman Act 82 has been applied to acts of
combinations of laborers when the effect of those acts was to
interfere with interstate commerce or to restrain trade. It is
unnecessary to enter here into a discussion of the question
whether or not Congress actually intended to include the activities
of labor organizations within the prohibitions of the act.8 3 It is
less important that ir. Gompers and other labor leaders believed
that Congress intended that labor unions should be outside the
scope of the act than it is that the Supreme Court should have
found the words of the statute so broad and inclusive that it
could discover no legal basis for exempting labor unions from the
operation of the act. The law declares in sweeping terms that
"Every contract, or combination in the form of a trust, or other-
wise in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." In
75 Sec. 10. Italics are the author's.
79 Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Penn. Co., (1893) 54 Fed. 730; same case,
ibid., p. 746.
80 Rev. Stat. Sec. 5440.
81 For detailed discussion of this whole point, with citation of cases, see
Judson, Interstate Commerce, 3rd ed., Chap. 6 and Secs. 408-417; Martin,
The Modern Law of Labor Unions, Chap. 14.
82 Note 72, supra.
83 A clear statement of both sides of the question is found in Laidler,
Boycotts and the Labor Struggle, 170 et seq.
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construing that act, the courts, with practical unanimity, 4 have
steadily refused to make any distinction between combinations
of capital and combinations of labor which were in restraint of
trade. In numerous cases injunctions have been issued by the
United States courts against such restraints of trade, or against
more direct obstructions of commerce by labor organizations ;85
while in the 'Danbury Hatters case the Supreme Court held
squarely that the provisions of the Sherman Act were applicable
to trade unions so as to permit the recovery from the members of
the hatters' union of triple damages by their employers whose
business had been injured by a secondary boycott.8 6
During the Pullman strike of 1893 a federal circuit court
issued an injunction based upon the provisions of the Sherman
Act, restraining Eugene V. Debs and other officers of the Ameri-
can Railway Union from interfering in any way with interstate
commerce or the' mails.87 When the case'came before the Su-
preme Court on appeal, however, the court declined to regard
the Sherman Act as the necessary source of the authority of the
court to issue the injunction (although not denying that it did
confer such power), but declared that the broad grant of author-
ity to the national government to regulate interstate commerce
was sufficient in itself to warrant the granting by the courts of
-injunctive relief against those who obstructed or restrained such
84 The only exception seems to be United States v. Patterson, (1893)
55 Fed. 605, in which the court took the view that "restraints of trade"
must be interpreted in the strict common law sense as meaning efforts to
"monopolize or grasp the market."
85 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, (1893) 54
Fed. 994, 26 L. R. A. 158; United States v. Debs, (1894) 64 Fed. 724. Other
cases in Martin, op. cit., 246, 247, note 81, supra.
86 Loewe v. Lawlor, (1908) 208 U. S. 274. 52 L. Ed. 488, 28 S. C. R., 301,
13 Ann. Cas. 815. The result reached in this case would seem to be im-
possible under -the existing law. The Clayton Act of October 15, 1914,
specifically declares that the labor of a human being is not to be regarded
as a commodity or article of commerce and that "nothing contained in the
anti-trust law shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations instituted for the pur-
pose of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, nor shall such organi-
zations oif members thereof be held or conitrued to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws." While
this act legalizes certain activities of labor organizations before regarded
as illegal, it does not, of course, have the effect of permitting any direct
and substantial obstructions of interstate commerce.
s7 United States v. Debs, (1894) 64 Fed. 724.
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commerce."" From this decision it would seem, therefore, to
follow that specific police legislation by Congress to prevent the
obstruction of interstate commerce is unnecessary to enable fed-
eral courts sitting in equity to prevent such obstruction.
To classify the Eight-Hour Law, popularly known as the
Adamson Law, 9 which was passed by Congress in the autumn
of 1916, as a police regulation to protect interstate commerce
from obstruction and interference will seem at first a, curious
perversion of facts. But those who will recall the legislative
history of the statute and examine carefully the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the case in which the constitutionality of the
law was upheld will be convinced that such a classification of the
act is accurate from the standpoint both of legislative intention
and of constitutional law. It seems perfectly clear that Congress
passed the law at the request of President Wilson for the single
purpose of averting the nation-wide railroad strike which there
was every reason to believe would take place if the law were not
passed. It is equally apparent that the Supreme Court upheld
the law on the ground that its passage was necessary to accom-
plish this result and avoid the threatened suspension of interstate
commerce. This remarkable decision merits some little comment.
In considering the validity of the Adamson Law, which was
questioned in the case of Wilson v. New,9" it was necessary for
the court to apply the same tests which it has always applied
to regulations of commerce enacted for police purposes.91 In the
first place, is the act a bona fide regulation of commerce; in the
second place, assuming that it is, does it deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law? The court
accordingly addressed itself to the question whether Congress
was really regulating interstate commerce when it established
an eight-hour day for trainmen on interstate railroads. The
answer of the court to this question was that the act was a regu-
lation of interstate commerce because its passage was necessary
in order to prevent the complete suspension of that commerce.
It alluded to the long list of acts, many of which have already
been discussed in this article , by which Congress had sought to
make interstate commerce safe and efficient. It mentioned par-
8 8 In re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092, 15 S. C. R. 900.
89 Act of September 3. 5, 1916, 39 Stat. at L. 721.
90 (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed..755, 37 S. C. R. 298.
9' Supra, p. 297 et seq.
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ticularly the Hours of Service Act, the Safety Appliance Acts,
and the Employers' Liability Act, in all of which the power to
regulate commerce had been used to control various relations
between employers and employees. It then pointed out "how
completely the purpose intended to be accomplished by the regu-
lations which had been adopted in the past would be rendered
unavailing or their enactment inexplicable if the power was not
possessed to meet a situation like the one with which this statute
[the Adamson Law] dealt. What would be the value of the
right to a reasonable rate if all movement in interstate commerce
could be stopped as the result of a mere dispute between the
parties or their failure to exert a primary right concerning a
matter of interstate commerce? Again, what purpose would be
subserved by all the regulations established to secure the enjoy-
ment by the public of an efficient and reasonable service if there
was no power in government to prevent all service from being
destroyed . . . ? And finally, to what derision would it not
reduce the proposition that government had power to enforce the
duty of operation if that power did not extend to doing that
which was essential to prevent operation from being completely
stopped . . .?"
The question whether the statute was in violation of the due
process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment was considered
by the court in a portion of the opinion which need not be treated
in detail here. It is sufficient to say that the abridgment of the
freedom of contract which the act entailed upon employers and
employees was found constitutionally permissible because both
were engaged in a business charged with a public interest and
therefore subject to types of congressional regulation which
could not be imposed upon any business except public utilities.
It is important to notice that the opinion of Chief Justice
White marks out an entirely new boundary line for the exercise
by Congress of its police power over interstate commerce for the
purpose of protecting that commerce from obstruction or suspen-
sion. In the earlier cases in which the court had been obliged to
decide whether or not a statute purporting to regulate commerce
actually did so, it was the subject matter of the regulation which
was examined. If the provisions of the statute bore a reasonable
and direct relationship to interstate commerce, then, in the ab-
sence of other constitutional defects, it was held a valid regulation
of commerce; if not, it was held invalid. It will be recalled that
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Mr. Justice Harlan in the majority opinion in the Adair case92
expressed the view that the provisions of the Erdman Act which
made it a penal offense for an interstate carrier to discharge an
employee because of his membership in a labor organization did
not have a sufficiently close relationship to interstate commerce
to make it a valid regulation thereof. Various other attempts of
Congress to regulate commerce have suffered the same fate.93
But in considering whether or not the Adamson Act was a bona
fide regulation of commerce the court paid practically no atten-
tion to what the law was about. The mind of the court was fixed
upon what would happen if the law was not passed. It was
urged upon the court that the law was, in effect, a regulation of
wages and as -such did not fall properly within the scope of the
commerce power. The court disposed of this objection by de-
claring that "if it be conceded that the power to enact the statute
was in effect the exercise of the right to fix wages where, by
reason of the dispute, there had been a failure to fix by agree-
ment, it would simply serve to show the nature and character of
the regulation essential to protect the public right and safeguard
the movement of interstate commerce, not involving any denial
of the authority to adopt it." In short, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the Supreme Court regarded the Adamson
Law as a regulation of interstate commerce, not because it dealt
with the wages or hours of labor of railroad employees, but
because its passage was demanded by an organization which was
in a position to bring about a total cessation of interstate com-
merce if its demand was not acceded to. If this is true, then
it would seem to follow that any legislation which forms the sub-
ject matter of the demands of a body of individuals possessing the
power to bring interstate commerce to a standstill if those de-
mands are not granted, must be regarded as a legitimate exer'cise
of the power of Congress to regulate commerce, provided such
legislation does not violate the due process of law clause or any
other specific constitutional prohibition. This startling doctrine
without doubt opens up some rather interesting possibilities in
the way of broadening the scope of the national police power
under the commerce clause.
The majority opinion in Wilson v. New is also interesting
92 Note 25, supra.
93 Supra, p. 298.
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because it asserts unequivocally that Congress could, without
exceeding its constitutional powers, enact a new type of police
regulation under the commerce clause: namely, a law providing
for the compulsory arbitration of disputes between interstate
carriers and their employees. In fact, Chief Justice White took
the point of view that the Adamson Act was in effect the award
of a tribunal before which the railroads and the brotherhoods
had been compelled- to arbitrate their differences. Instead of
creating special machinery for such arbitration, Congress itself
served as the arbitral tribunal and enacted its award into law.
"We are of opinion," declared the chief justice, "that
the act which is before us was clearly within the legislative power
of Congress to adopt, and that, in substance and effect, it
amounted to an exercise of its authority under the circumstances
disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between the parties
by establishing as to the subject matter of that dispute a legisla-
tive standard of wages operative and binding as a matter of law
upon the parties,-a power none the less efficaciously exerted
because exercised by direct legislative act instead of by the en-
actment of other and appropriate means providing for the bring-
ing about of such result." While it was unnecessary to the
decision of the case for the court to state whether or not it would
regard the general scheme of compulsory arbitration applicable
to interstate carriers constitutional, the dictum was couched in
such language and the underlying principle of the whole case is
such as to leave little room for doubt that the court would regard
such a system as a legitimate exercise of the power to regulate
commerce. Congress has enacted several laws aimed to provide
facilities for the arbitration of labor disputes affecting interstate
commerce, 94 but it has never made it obligatory upon the parties
to such disputes to arbitrate; these laws providing for mediation,
conciliation, and voluntary arbitration are not, therefore, police
regulations in the sense in which that term is used in this article,
since they subject no one to restraint or compulsion. It seems
clear, however, in light of the utterances of the court in Wilson
v. New, that the continuance of the voluntary system of arbitra-
tion is a matter to be settled by legislative discretion alone, and
that as soon as Congress deems it expedient an effective system of
94 Act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. at L. 501; Act of June 1, 1898, 30
Stat. at L. 424; Act of July 15, 1913, 38 Stat. at L. 738.
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compulsory arbitration could be put into force without violating
any provision of the constitution.
By way of summary of the ground covered thus far, it is ap-
parent that no insignificant amount of legislation, social and
economic in character, legislation which may properly be called
national police legislation, has been passed by Congress in pur-
suance of its authority to protect and promote interstate com-
merce. In order to protect the lives, limbs, and property of thos6
who are concerned with interstate commerce as passengers, ship-
pers, or employees, Congress has enacted a most elaborate series
of provisions relating to the physical appliances and regulations
necessary to insure such safety. For the same purpose Congress
has regulated in various ways the conditions under which the em-
ployees engaged in interstate commerce shall do their work. And
the courts have taken a rather generous view of the amount of
such welfare legislation which may be justified constitutionally
upon the theory that it promotes the safety, reliability, and effi-
ciency of interstate commerce. Finally, in order to prevent the
obstruction of interstate commerce, Congress has been forced to
deal with the complex problem of monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade, has imposed restrictions upon the freedom
of action of organized labor, and, where collective bargaining has
broken down, has assumed the role of an arbiter in disputes
between labor and capital. In short, congressional responsibility
for the safe, free, uninterrupted flow of commerce between the
states carries with it the constitutional authority to legislate upon
a wide range of problems, not commonly regarded as commercial
in character, which vitally affect the national safety and welfare.
(To be continued.)
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